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GLOBALIZATION, RIGHTS, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Manoj Mate
†
Abstract: This article examines the broader and evolving role of the
Supreme Court of India in an era of globalization by examining the Court’s decision-
making in rights-based challenges to economic liberalization, privatization, and 
development policies over the past three decades. While the Court has been mostly 
deferential in its review of these policies and projects, it has in many cases been active 
and instrumental in remaking and reshaping regulatory frameworks, bureaucratic 
structures, accountability norms, and in redefining the terrain of fundamental rights that 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other litigants have invoked in challenges 
to these policies. This article argues that the Court has deployed rights as “structuring 
principles” in order to evaluate and review liberalization and privatization policies, based 
on constitutional or statutory illegality, arbitrariness or unreasonableness, or corruption,
and framed rights as “substantive-normative principles” to assess development policies.
This article argues that the Court’s particular approach to rights-based judicial review has 
resulted in the creation of “asymmetrical rights terrains” that privilege the rights and 
interests of private commercial and industrial stakeholders and government officials and 
agencies, above the rights and interests of labor, villagers, farmers, and tribes. The article
concludes by suggesting that the Court’s approach to judicial review reflects a unique 
model of adjudication in which high courts play an active role in shaping the meaning of 
rights, regulatory structure and norms, and the legal-constitutional discourse of 
globalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, globalization has fundamentally transformed 
relationships between nation states as well as the terrain of domestic 
political, constitutional, and regulatory frameworks that govern economic 
and development policies, particularly in developing nations.
1
As part of 
this global trend, developing nations have shifted from statist-socialist 
policies toward economic liberalization, privatization, and development 
policies in line with the broader globalization of the world economy.
2
International institutions and organizations, including the World Bank and 
†
Associate Professor of Law, Whittier Law School, Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science, 
Whittier College. J.D., Harvard Law School, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley.
1
For scholarship on globalization, see generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (2004); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Barbara Harriss-
White et al., Globalisation, Economic Citizenship and India’s Inclusive Developmentalism, in CITIZENSHIP 
AS CULTURAL FLOW: STRUCTURE, AGENCY AND POWER (Subrata K. Mitra ed., 2012); Judith White, 
Globalization, Divestment, and Human Rights in Burma, 14 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 47, 47–65 (2005).
2
See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial 
Institutions, and the Third World, 32 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 243, 255–62 (2000); Kanishka Jayasuriya, 
Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory 
Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 425, 445 (1999).
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), have played a central role in pressuring 
shifts toward economic reforms aimed at liberalization and privatization, and
in directly funding development projects.
3
These shifts have also helped 
reshape and influence lawyering and legal practice, constitutional and policy 
norms, and constitutional adjudication on these issues.
4
Internationally, there has been a resurgence of critical legal 
scholarship regarding the impact of globalization on human rights and 
constitutional adjudication.
5
While there has been significant opposition to 
these policies within the political sphere in countries like India, much of the 
contestation and challenge to these policies has also been through court-
based litigation.  Indeed, because these policy shifts have often been 
executive-led and effectuated with limited policy debates in Parliament, 
opposition parties, grassroots groups and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have had no choice but to use the courts as the primary forum for 
challenging and mobilizing oppositional support against globalization 
policies of the government.
6
While a significant body of scholarship across 
many disciplines has analyzed the spread of economic liberalization and 
privatization policies globally, as well as challenges to these development 
policies from the perspective of human rights,
7
less attention has been given 
to the primary role that constitutional courts and high courts play in 
reshaping the terrain of rights and regulatory structures.
8
3
See generally BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD-WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) [hereinafter RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FROM BELOW]; Shalini Randeria, Globalization of Law: Environmental Justice, World Bank, NGOs 
and the Cunning State in India 51 CURRENT SOC. 305 (2003).
4
See, e.g., GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002); Terence C. Halliday and Pavel 
Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447 (2006).
5
See, e.g., UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); Surya Deva, Human Rights 
Realization in an Era of Globalization:  The Indian Experience, 12 BUFFALO HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2006); 
Upendra Baxi, Access to Justice in a Globalized Economy: Some Reflections, in INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE
GOLDEN JUBILEE 1956–2006, 27 (2007); Judith Resnick, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), 
Constitutionalization, and Statization: Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 162 (2013).
6
See Ashutosh Varshney, Mass politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in 
Comparative Perspective, 2 J. POL’Y REFORM 301 (1998); Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The 
Indian Parliament as an Institution of Accountability, U.N. Doc. PP/DGHR/23 (Jan. 23, 2006), 22–29.
7
For recent scholarship on the intersection of globalization and human rights, see generally
RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3; Surya Deva, Human Rights Realization in 
an Era of Globalization:  The Indian Experience, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2006).  
8
For an example of work that does explore how law and courts shape the regulatory context in 
India, see Chiranjib Sen & Anil Suraj, The Role of Legal Process in the Redesign of Indian Government-
Business Relations (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., and the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 102, 2009), 
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22692/No_102_SenSuraj_Legal_Process_India_91909.pdf.
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This article analyzes the role that the Supreme Court of India has
played in adjudicating constitutional challenges to India’s globalization 
policies.  Specifically, it examines how the Court, through its decisions, has 
reconstituted and reshaped constitutional and regulatory frameworks 
governing economic liberalization and privatization policy and development 
policy in India. Part II examines broader shifts in the Supreme Court’s 
fundamental rights jurisprudence from the post-Emergency period to the 
post-liberalization era.
9
Part III analyzes how the Court has redefined the 
scope and terrain of rights and judicial review and helped reshape and 
reconstitute regulatory frameworks in the areas of liberalization and 
privatization.  Part IV examines how the Court has redefined the scope of 
rights and judicial review in development decisions, and how its decisions 
have reshaped development narratives and created new development 
governance structures that impact the terrain of rights. Part V concludes by 
considering the implications of the Court’s approach to adjudicating 
globalization policies for the future of rights advocacy and litigation in 
India.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE TERRAIN OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN INDIA
As India’s economy underwent major transformation in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the Supreme Court’s approach to the interpretation of 
fundamental rights and application of rights-based scrutiny also 
fundamentally changed.  In cases involving major rights-based challenges to 
economic liberalization, privatization, and development policies in the post-
1991 era, the Court redefined and adjudicated the scope and meaning of the 
core fundamental rights contained in Article 14 (equality before the law),
10
Article 19 (speech, assembly, and other freedoms),
11
and Article 21 (life and 
9
The Emergency period refers to the period of Emergency rule under Indira Gandhi from 1975 to 
1977.  Gandhi declared Emergency in 1975, citing both internal and external reasons as justifications.  
During this period, the government enacted a series of constitutional amendments and laws that curbed 
judicial power and repressed rights and freedoms.  See generally GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 391–94 (1999).
10
Article 14 provides: “Equality before law-- The State shall not deny to any person equality before 
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”  INDIA CONST. art. 14.
11
Article 19, § 1 provides:  (1) All citizens shall have the right –
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assembly peaceable and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions; 
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) to acquire, hold, and dispose of private property (repealed by 44
th
Amendment) 
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.”  Id. art. 19.
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liberty) of the Indian Constitution.
12
The Court dramatically expanded the 
scope of these rights in the post-Emergency era to create a new arsenal of 
rights-based frameworks of scrutiny, along with a new regime of public 
interest litigation aimed at correcting human rights and governance 
failures.
13
However, as this Part illustrates, since the 1990s the Court has 
reinterpreted and arguably restricted the scope of these rights, and modified 
the nature of rights-based scrutiny in the realm of globalization policies.  
A. The Birth of Fundamental Rights in the Post-Emergency Era
Following the conclusion of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency regime in 
1977 and the election of the Janata party regime in 1977, the Supreme Court 
of India launched a new activism and expanded the scope of the fundamental 
rights contained in Articles 14, 19, and 21.
14
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
India (1978), the Court held that the rights contained in each of these 
Articles were inter-related; in subsequent decisions, the Court suggested that 
these rights were inviolable basic features of the Constitution.
15
The Indian 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of judicial review under Article 
14’s equality guarantee, read together with the rights in Article 19 and 21,
reflects the particular normative worldviews of judges regarding both their 
institutional role in judicial review of government economic policy, as well 
as their broader understandings of the proper role of government in 
economic policy.
16
In reinterpreting the scope of these rights provisions, the Court also 
constructed new and more robust standards of rights-based scrutiny.  In the 
landmark decision Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Court
12
Article 21 provides: “No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.”  Id. art. 21.
13
See Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 128 (1985) [hereinafter Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously].
14
See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS (1980); Baxi, Taking 
Suffering Seriously, supra note 13, at 128; S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING 
BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS 110–22 (2002).
15
Justice Chandrachud’s lead opinion in Minerva Mills v. Union of India suggested that Articles 14, 
19, and 21 constituted a “golden triangle” of rights that were part of the basic features of the Constitution.
Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 206, 255.  See also I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. (1999) 7 
SCC 580, 581–83 (reaffirming that the golden triangle of Article 14, 19 and 21 is part of the basic 
structure)
16
See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 13, at 128 (1985); SATHE, supra note 14, at 165–
66 (2002); Manoj Mate, Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India, in
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 262–86 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. 
eds., 2013); Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Public Interest 
Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 175, 179–209 (2010).
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rejected its earlier decision in Gopalan by effectively reading in substantive 
due process into the term “procedure established by law” in Article 21, and 
recognized a new standard of non-arbitrariness review based on Article 14 
and Article 21.
17
Under this new interpretive approach, the Court began to 
recognize a wide range of fundamental rights based on both the right to life 
and liberty and the rights contained in Article 19.
18
In addition, the Court 
held that the rights contained in Articles 19 and 21 were not mutually 
exclusive and that deprivation of these rights would be reviewed under the 
standard of reasonableness under Article 19.
19
In recognizing a new doctrine of non-arbitrariness, the Court in 
Maneka Gandhi radically altered the scope of the right to equality under 
Article 14, which had previously been thought to only guarantee equality 
and equal protection under the law.
20
Reading Article 21 together with 
Article 14, the Court held that the procedures referenced in Article 21’s 
protection of life and liberty must be “right and just and fair and not 
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.”
21
Under this new standard of “non-
arbitrariness” review based on Article 14 and 21, the Court could now 
subject government policies and actions infringing on fundamental rights to 
a higher level of scrutiny.
22
The Court reiterated and applied this non-
arbitrariness standard in later cases like Ajay Hasia v. Khalid M. Sehravadi,
17
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 283; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,
[1950] SCR 88; P. Jain, The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF INDIA 1, 23–26 (S.K. Verma & Kusum eds., 2000).  In drafting Article 21, the Constituent 
Assembly adopted the language “No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law” in order to avoid the possibility of judicially created doctrines of substantive 
due process and judicial activism in challenging government policies.  However, by expansively 
interpreting Articles 14 and 21 together, the Court in Maneka effectively introduced substantive due 
process into the Indian Constitution.  See Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of 
Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases , 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216 (2010) 
[hereinafter Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India].
18
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248 (recognizing broad scope of the right to 
life and liberty under a substantive due process conception of Article 21.  See also Hussainara Khatoon v.
State of Bihar, (1979) SC 1377; Francis Mullin v. Administrator Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC
608, 618 (recognizing the right to life); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 463 (right to clean 
air); Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545 (right to shelter); CERC v Union of 
India, (1995) 3 SCC 42 (right to health); Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 (right to 
personal liberty includes right to be free of torture).
19
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 284–86.
20
See B.N. Srikrishna, Skinning a Cat, 8 SCC(J) 3 (2005), http://www.ebc india.com/lawyer/ 
articles/2005_8_3.htm.
21
Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India, supra note 17, at 247 (citing Maneka Gandhi v. Union 
of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 673).
22
See Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 283–84 (holding that equality is 
antithetical to arbitrariness and articulating a new standard of non-arbitrariness review based on the right to 
equality in Article 14).
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R.D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority, and D.S. Nakara v. Union of 
India, where the Court applied robust rights-based scrutiny in its review of 
government policies under arbitrariness review.
23
Building on this expanded interpretation of these rights provisions, the 
Court also expanded the scope of its role through the development of public 
interest litigation (PIL), wherein the Court expanded standing for third 
parties to file public interest suits to challenge government policies, 
governance failures, and human rights violations.
24
In the post-Emergency 
years, the Court gradually expanded its role in governance, environmental 
policy, and human rights cases through PIL.
25
In the process, it not only 
recognized a broad array of fundamental rights, but also increasingly 
expanded its assertiveness in challenging the Central Government in key 
domains, including judicial appointments, corruption, and environmental 
governance.
26
But as reflected in subsequent cases, the Court has been 
selective in wielding Article 14’s non-arbitrariness review, fashioning a 
variant of the “double standard” approach whereby economic and social 
policies of the government receive lower, rational-basis type judicial 
review.
27
While the Supreme Court of India was building an expansive 
infrastructure of fundamental rights in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it also 
signaled a distinctly lower and more limited standard of review in the area of 
economic and social policy. During the 1980s, the Supreme Court of India 
was highly deferential to the government in cases involving challenges to 
government economic policies. This is illustrated by the Court’s decision in 
R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981), which involved a challenge to the 
Gandhi regime’s enactment of the Bearer Bonds Act.
28
In R.K. Garg, the 
23
See R.D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority, (1979) SCC 489 (applying doctrine of 
nonarbitrariness inherent in Articles 14, 19, and 21 to the Bombay Municipal Corporation’s International 
Airport Authority’s failure to comply with its own stated standards of eligibility in a notice for tenders for 
restaurant/snack bars in Bombay Airport; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid M. Sehravadi, (1981) 1 SCC 722; D.S. 
Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, 319.  
24
See SATHE, supra note 14, at 205–19. For a discussion on how the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court, under the leadership of chief Justice Asshiddiqie, similarly expanded the Indonesian standing 
doctrine to encompass third-parties, such as taxpayers and consumers, and to human rights NGOs, see 
Stefanus Hendrianto, The Rise and fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial 
Leadership in Indonesia, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 490, 517–20 (2016).
25
See id.
26
See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 13, at 127–28; Manoj Mate, The Rise of Judicial 
Governance, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 169, 186–96 (2014).
27
See, e.g., In re Special Courts Bill, (1979) 2 SCR 476 (upholding constitutionality of Special 
Courts to try emergency offenses in advisory opinion).
28
See R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675.
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Court upheld the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) 
Ordinance Act enacted by the Gandhi Congress regime.  This legislation was 
enacted by the Executive (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Council of 
Ministers) within the Congressional government as an ordinance to deal with 
the problem of “black money” (money that had been earned without being 
officially reported for tax purposes), and was later passed as an Act by 
Parliament.  The Act granted immunity from prosecution under the Income 
Tax Act to individuals who purchased these bonds with black money, and 
forbid any investigation into the source of this money.
29
While endorsing the underlying policy merits of the Bearer Bonds 
Act, the Court in R.K. Garg held that the Act’s separate treatment of black 
money investors did not violate Article 14 on the grounds that the 
classification had a rational basis in supporting the government’s efforts to 
channel black money back into the productive sector to promote economic 
growth.
30
Additionally, the majority held that the Court could not challenge 
the morality of particular legislation based on Article 14, and stressed the 
need for a deferential, rational-basis mode of review when examining
government economic policies.
31
In so holding, the Court effectively 
announced a “double standard” approach, applying the new heightened 
standard of Article 14 non-arbitrariness review to claims involving direct 
abrogation of fundamental rights, while applying a lower, rational-basis 
review to economic policy.
B. Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review: The Post-Liberalization 
Era and Beyond
In the early 1990s, the Congress government of P.V. Narasimha Rao 
launched the New Economic Policy, in which the government initiated new 
liberalization policies.
32
This included the introduction of policies aimed at 
deregulation, liberalization of government licensing regimes, and a shift 
toward privatization of government owned enterprises.
33
Following the 
adoption of the New Economic Policy, the Supreme Court provided greater 
clarity in articulating the scope of judicial review under Article 14 and 
Article 21 in a series of decisions involving challenges to privatization of the 
29
See id. at 698–700.
30
See id. at 705–06.
31
Id.
32
See SURESH TENDULKAR & T.A. BHAVANI, UNDERSTANDING REFORMS: POST-1991 INDIA 1–5
(2007).
33
See David B. H. Denoon, Cycles in Indian Economic Liberalization, 1966–1996, 31 COMP. POL.
43, 52–55 (1988).
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telecom sector, the privatization and disinvestment of the industrial and 
mining sector, and other cases.  In most of these cases, the Court upheld and 
endorsed the governments’ policies of economic liberalization.
Since the 1990s, and well into the twenty-first century, the Supreme 
Court of India has effectively redefined the scope and terrain of the 
fundamental rights in a series of decisions involving challenges to 
government liberalization and privatization, and development policies. In 
calibrating this new “globalization rights infrastructure” and attendant 
modes of scrutiny for globalization policies, this article explores three main 
facets of the Court’s decision-making and role.
First, the Court has redefined and carefully limited its own role in the 
domain of globalization policies based on the justices’ own conceptions of 
the proper role of the Court, and their own understanding of the norms and 
values that should be advanced in adjudicating globalization cases.  In 
embracing these particular role conceptions, the Court has effectively 
redefined the normative structure and discourse of globalization by 
privileging certain norms and values in its adjudication, including norms of 
transparency, competitiveness, regulatory independence, and high growth 
models of development.  In doing so, this article argues that while the Court 
has applied a lower and more limited standard of review to globalization 
policies, it has effectively deployed rights as “structuring principles” for 
adjudicating the fairness, legality, and propriety of government economic
policies and actions involving privatization and disinvestment, rather than 
allowing these rights to serve as strong checks on government policies and 
actions. In the development context, this article suggests that rights have 
been deployed as “substantive-normative principles” that are used to assess
and validate the legality and optimality of development projects and policies
under a highly deferential mode of review. In deploying rights in this way, 
the Court has redefined and reshaped the processes and regulatory structures 
that govern in these areas.  
Second, the Court’s new globalization rights framework has 
effectively meant the creation of new “asymmetrical rights terrains” wherein
the rights of certain interests and stakeholders (including private corporate 
interests) are privileged above others (labor, farmers, villagers).  The Court 
has thus restricted the scope of the fundamental rights so as to limit their 
promise to laborers, farmers, and others whose rights have been infringed or 
diminished by globalization policies, while enhancing the rights of certain 
entities including private corporate interests challenging unfair privatization 
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and disinvestment policies.  This broader trend includes weakened 
recognition of the rights of laborers in challenging privatization and 
disinvestment policies, and the rights of farmers and villagers in challenging 
large scale development projects.
Third, the Court has fundamentally redefined its own role as an 
adjudicator and governance institution in the realm of privatization and 
development policies.  This article argues that these fundamental shifts in 
the Court’s approach to rights-based adjudication, and in its institutional role 
in globalization policy provide a lens into broader shifts in the Court’s role 
and jurisprudence in the twenty-first century.
III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: LIBERALIZATION AND 
PRIVATIZATION
In the area of liberalization and privatization, the Supreme Court of India 
has consciously embraced a particular conception of its own role as an
institution in adopting a deferential and limited scope of review of these 
policies.  Despite its careful delineation of a highly deferential and limited 
judicial role in cases involving government policies and actions in economic 
policy-making, the Court’s decisions suggest that it has not been neutral 
when it comes to the underlying substantive norms behind these policies. 
Although the Court has adopted a highly deferential standard of review, its 
decisions reveal discursive narratives evincing broad support for the goals of 
liberalization and privatization. At the same time, the Court has effectively 
sought to advance the normative goals of fairness, transparency, 
competitiveness, and a level playing field, while also policing against 
corruption. This Part analyzes how the Court has deployed fundamental 
rights as “structuring principles” to assess the legality of government 
liberalization and privatization policies.  It then examines how the Court has 
effectively created an “asymmetrical rights terrain” in the domain of 
liberalization and privatization policies by privileging certain rights and 
interests over others through limitations on public interest litigation and 
recognizing corporate rights over labor rights.  Finally, it explores how the 
Court has played a significant and important role in shaping and overseeing 
the regulatory context and in actively policing corruption.
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A. Rights as Structuring Principles: Deferential and Limited Review
In the early 1990s, the Court adjudicated challenges to a series of 
reform policies involving India’s telecom sector.
34
In Delhi Science Forum,
the Court adjudicated a challenge to the adoption of the National Telecom 
Policy, whereby the government shifted toward privatization of the 
industry.
35
Pursuant to this policy, the government issued licenses to 
companies that made tender offers for telecom licenses. The Court 
ultimately upheld the privatization of the telecom sector. In rejecting 
arguments challenging the merits of the underlying policies, the Court held 
that it could not question the merits of the policy and that the proper place 
for substantive challenges was Parliament and the political process, not the 
courts.
36
Notably, the Court in its decision recognized the virtues of a robust 
telecom sector as part of the broader shift toward globalization, noting:
Telecommunications has been internationally recognized as a 
public utility of strategic importance . . . . Because of the 
economic growth and commercial changes in different parts of 
the world, need for interconnectivity means that communication 
systems have to be compatible with each and other and have to 
be actually interconnected.  Because of this there is a demand 
even in developing countries to have communication system of 
international standards.
37
In addition, the Court in Delhi Science Forum took note of the trend toward 
privatization of telecom in developed countries, and observed that “[b]y and 
large it was realized that this sector needed acceleration because of the 
adoption of liberalized economic policy for the economic growth of the 
country.”
38
34
In 1991 the Congress regime of P.V. Narasimha Rao launched liberalization reforms that sought to 
move India from a socialist to a more open, market-based economy with less government controls, 
regulation and state-owned enterprises. Successive governments continued and expanded these policies. 
See id.
35
Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405, 410–12.  This section draws in part on 
the discussion of economic policy decisions in Manoj Mate, Elite Institutionalism and Judicial 
Assertiveness in the Supreme Court of India, 28 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 361, 421–24 (2014) 
[hereinafter Mate, Elite Institutionalism].
36
Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405, 412.
37
Id. at 411.
38
Id. at 412.
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The Court in Delhi Science Forum sought to refine Article 14’s non-
arbitrariness standard for review of government and administrative decisions 
involving economic policy.  According to the Court, review under this 
standard must also be limited to determining whether such decisions are: 1)
made in bad faith; 2) based on irrational or irrelevant considerations; or 3)
made without following the prescribed procedures required under a statute 
(illegality).
39
In applying this limited scope of scrutiny, the Court ultimately 
upheld the telecom policy as legal and consistent with the Indian Telegraph 
Act, and also upheld it on the grounds of reasonableness.  
In later cases, the Court was also deferential to subsequent regimes’ 
disinvestment policies, and further delineated the contours of Article 14 non-
arbitrariness and reasonableness review.  In BALCO Employees Union v. 
Union of India (2001), the Court upheld the government’s disinvestment in
and sale of the Bharat Aluminum Corporation to a private company, 
Sterlite.
40
In reaching its decision, the Court held that economic policies 
must be reviewed under a highly deferential rational basis scrutiny, and that 
courts should limit their review to whether policy decisions are “absolutely 
capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable, or violative of constitutional or 
statutory provisions.”
41
The Court upheld the disinvestment and found that 
it had not been shown to be “capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed” 
and that the process was completely transparent.
42
The majority’s decision 
was noteworthy in that it endorsed the need for disinvestment and change in
economic policies.
43
Significantly, the Court adopted a restricted approach toward labor 
rights and held that the employees of the BALCO union did not have a right 
to a hearing prior to the disinvestment of government owned enterprises 
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
44
In adopting this approach, 
the Court refused to recognize a potentially wider scope of the right of 
laborers to challenge government privatization and disinvestment. In 
39
Id. at 417–18.  The standard applied in Delhi Science Forum drew on the approach applied in Tata 
Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 (upholding six licensing decisions under new licensing regime 
while  striking down two decisions).  See also Arun K. Thiruvengadam & Piyush Joshi, Judiciaries as 
Crucial Actors in Southern Regulatory systems: A Case Study of Indian Telecom Regulation, 6 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 327, 334–35 (2012).
40
Bharat Aluminum Company, Ltd. Employees Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333, 363 
[hereinafter BALCO].
41
Id. at 360 (citing M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1997) 7 SCC 592).
42
BALCO, 2 SCC at 362.
43
Id. at 355.
44
Id. at 363.  Article 16 of the Indian Constitution provides for equality of opportunity in 
government employment or appointment to government positions.  INDIA CONST. art. 16.
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reaching this decision, the Court also observed that workers had some level 
of protection in the Shareholders Agreement between the Union of India and 
their strategic partner, and also had protection under existing statutes 
including the Industrial Dispute Act, which provides that management 
(including the new management of BALCO) must provide for collective 
bargaining and other rights.
45
However, it should be noted that these labor 
rights are statutory, not constitutional rights.
Finally, the Court in BALCO significantly restricted the scope of 
public interest litigation challenges in suggesting that PIL had become 
increasingly abused by litigants, and that courts should not entertain PILs 
challenging the merits of policies. In reiterating and defining these 
suggested parameters of PIL, the Court sought to effectively limit the scope 
of PIL and the ability of litigants to deploy PIL in private challenges to 
government policies. In its decision, the Court noted that it has mainly 
entertained PILs involving “violations of Article 21, or of human rights, or 
where the litigation has been initiated for the benefit of the poor and the 
underprivileged who are unable to come to court due to some 
disadvantage.”
46
Building on its decisions in Delhi Science Forum and BALCO, the 
Court has mostly upheld government policies involving economic 
liberalization and privatization.
47
However, the Court has been assertive in 
invalidating government policies or actions in cases of clear illegality, 
unconstitutionality, or corruption.
48
In addition, in defining the scope and 
understanding of arbitrariness under Article 14, the Court has also 
acknowledged the need to examine business norms in adjudicating whether 
government decision-making processes have infirmities in terms of 
arbitrariness.  For example, in Reliance Airport Developers Ltd. v. Airport 
Authority of India (2006), the Court held that accounting or other business 
norms and benchmarks should be used in certain cases in order to assess the 
fairness and legality of privatization schemes.
49
45
BALCO, 2 SCC at 363.
46
Id. at 381.
47
See Mate, Elite Institutionalism, supra note 35, at 420–25.
48
See, e.g., Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2003) SC 350 (invalidating the 
government’s privatization of government oil companies through disinvestment in two of India’s major 
petroleum companies based on failure to secure Parliamentary approval).
49
See Reliance Airport Developers Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, (2006) 10 SCC 1.
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B. Globalization and Rights Privileging: Mapping the Asymmetrical 
Rights Terrain of Liberalization and Privatization 
The Court has effectively created an “asymmetrical rights terrain” in
the domain of economic liberalization and privatization. In articulating the 
scope of fundamental rights in economic policy cases, the Supreme Court 
has restricted labor rights by holding that laborers do not have strong 
constitutional rights to challenge government policies and actions. As 
illustrated in BALCO, the Court has restricted workers’ rights to challenge 
government policies under a narrow and limited standard of review under 
Article 14.  In rejecting strong constitutional protections for labor, the Court 
has effectively bolstered government efforts to reform India’s labor laws.
50
This dynamic is illustrated in Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil 
Nadu (2003), in which the Court drew on a series of earlier precedents and 
held that employees did not have a constitutional or statutory right to strike
under Articles 19(1) and Article 21.
51
In refusing to recognize constitutional 
or statutory rights to strike, the Court relied on the extraordinary harms and 
costs to society that result from strikes.
52
The Court in Rangarajan and 
other cases actually helped to advance the government’s labor reform 
agenda.  In the post-2000 era, successive regimes were unable to enact
comprehensive labor market reforms aimed at restricting labor rights 
because of opposition from the Left Front (including the communist 
parties).
53
However, the Court arguably assisted the Government in this 
process by issuing decisions that restricted labor rights.
54
In contrast to its more restricted approach to labor rights, the Court 
has held that Articles 14, 19, and 21 provide protections for the rights and 
interests of private corporate and business entities. This is illustrated by the 
Court’s decision in Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road 
Development Corporation Ltd. (2007). In Reliance, the Court adjudicated a 
challenge to the Maharashtra state government’s floating of global tender for 
completion for the Mumbai Trans Harbour Link.
55
The Court interpreted 
Article 14 as a “non-discrimination” provision and held that it must be read 
in conjunction with both Article 21 and Article 19 of the Constitution.  
50
See TENDULKAR & BHAVANI, supra note 32, at 145–46.
51
T.K. Rangarajan v. Gov’t of Tamil Nadu, (2003) 6 SCC 581, 589–92.
52
Id. at 591–92.
53
See TENDULKAR & BHAVANI, supra note 32, at 148.
54
Id.
55
Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corp. Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 1, 7–8.
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According to the Court, Article 21’s protection for the “right to life” also 
included protections for “opportunity.”  The Court thus held that Article 
19(1)(g), which guarantees a “fundamental right to carry on business to a 
company,” also gives rise to the “level playing field” doctrine for private 
businesses that “provides space within which equally placed competitors are 
allowed to bid so as to subserve the larger public interest.”
56
Justice 
Kapadia grounded the level playing field concept in a globalization 
rationale, noting that “[g]lobalisation, in essence is liberalization of trade . . . 
. Decisions or acts which result in unequal and discriminatory treatment, 
would violate the doctrine of ‘level playing field’ embodied in Article 
19(1)(g).”
57
Because the Maharashtra state government failed to clearly specify 
the accounting norms for calculating the net cash profit for a designated 
number of years, which was one of the criteria specified in the tender 
conditions, the government’s decision to exclude business entities based on 
that failure violated Article 14 and 19. The Court ordered that appellants 
Reliance Energy Ltd. and Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company 
Ltd. be allowed to participate again in the bidding process.
58
Interestingly, even in contexts where the Court has refused to 
recognize fundamental rights to carry on business under Article 19, recent 
decisions suggest that the logic of globalization itself may influence how 
judges interpret the scope and nature of the private business rights under
Article 19.  For example, in a 2004 decision, State of Punjab v. Devans 
Modern Breweries Ltd.,
59
a five judge constitutional bench adjudicated a set
of appeals arising out of a constitutional reference made by a three judge 
bench as to whether state governments were permitted to impose taxes on 
the sale of liquor and whether such taxes violated rights under Article 301 
and Article 19(1)(g).
60
Applying the doctrine of “[r]es extra commercium,”
a three-judge majority of the Court reaffirmed its earlier jurisprudence that 
because rights to trade or sell liquor are part of the state’s privilege and 
within the purview of the state’s police power, there is no fundamental right 
56
Id. at 21.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 21, 32.
59
State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26.
60
Id. at 99–101.  Article 301 states, “[f]reedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Subject to the 
other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be 
free.”  INDIA CONST. art. 301.  Article 19(1)(g) provides that all citizens shall have the right “to practice any 
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business.”  Id. art. 19(1)(g).
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to trade or sell liquor under Article 301 or Article 19(1)(g).
61
Under the res 
extra commercium doctrine, the state has the power to restrict fundamental 
rights in order to prohibit activities that are considered immoral, criminal, or 
injurious to the public health, safety, and welfare.
62
The majority thus held 
that rights-based challenges under Articles 19 and Article 14 (equality and 
non-arbitrariness) could not be brought against state taxes on liquor.
63
In 
contrast, two dissenting opinions by Justices B.N. Agrawal and Justice Sinha
rejected the applicability of the res extra commercium doctrine and held that 
the trade or sale of liquor is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) and 
Article 301.
64
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Sinha went further by suggesting 
that broader social and economic changes brought on by globalization 
should inform the Court’s approach to interpreting Article 19 and observed:
Globalisation has brought a radical change in the economic and 
social landscape of the country . . . . As and when occasion 
arises the interface between the globalisation and 
constitutionalism whether from economic perspective or human 
rights perspective is required to be seriously gone into. The 
Court will have to take a realistic view in interpretation of 
Constitution having regard to the changing economic 
scenario.
65
In addition, Sinha argued that global changes in international trade 
and liberalization had brought about social changes regarding the perceived 
morality of liquor.
66
He also held that the majority should have also 
considered the impact of its decision on “global changes and outlook in trade 
and commerce.”
67
61
State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26, 108–14.
62
See Arvind Datar,  Privilege, Police Power and Res Extra Commercium—Glaring Conceptual 
Errors, 21 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 133, 145–46 (2009), http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/ 
Upload/8DE9E7DE-8DDA-48FE-9682-1C0F0B185AF3.pdf.
63
Id.
64
See State of Punjab v. Devans Breweries, (2004) 11 SCC 26, 70–76, 84–95, 130–38, 140–48.
65
Id. at 145–46.
66
Id. at 146 (Sinha, J. dissenting) (“[T]he States are encouraging liberalization to such an extent that 
in the near future alcohol beverages may be allowed to be sold in the small grocery shops. . . .  The society 
has accepted pub culture in the metros.  A view in the matter, therefore, is required to be taken having 
regard to the changing scenario on the basis of ground reality and not on the basis of the centuries’ old 
maxims.”).
67
Id. (Sinha, J. dissenting) (“Socialism might have been a catchword from our history. It may be 
present in the Preamble of our Constitution.  However, due to the liberalization policy adopted by the 
 
                                                        
658 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
In adjudicating cases involving private broadcasting rights in the post-
liberalization era, the Court has also suggested that Article 19 provides some 
protections to private broadcasters.  In the landmark Airwaves case in 1994,
the Court adjudicated a dispute between the Cricket Association of Bengal 
and Doordarshan (a publicly owned broadcasting company) over telecasting 
rights for the “Hero Cup” international cricket tournament.
68
In its ruling, 
the Court recognized that Article 19 encompassed the rights of private 
broadcasters to broadcast cricket matches, while at the same time 
recognizing that the television airwaves spectrum was a public resource and 
that the government-run Doordarshan station could charge licensing fees to 
private broadcasters.
69
The Court effectively adopted a middle-ground 
approach and held that while Doordarshan should play an important role in 
offering free access to cricket matches for the majority of the country 
lacking cable access, it should not have a monopoly, and private 
broadcasters should also have a right to telecast the event to international 
viewers outside of India with cable.
70
In recognizing a “right to 
information” based on Article 19, the Court posited that government or 
private monopolies in broadcasting would interfere with the right to 
broadcast or receive information.
71
It is clear that the Court’s rights jurisprudence in economic policy 
cases has created an asymmetrical bias that favors corporate interests and 
rights in the adjudicative process. This “asymmetrical rights terrain” reflects 
the preeminence and growing importance of private law concepts within 
constitutional law in India.
72
While Article 14 and 19 have been deployed as 
structural principles for evaluating the fairness of processes and statutory 
compliance, this process-based norm effectively privileges corporate 
interests as the potential beneficiaries of a non-arbitrariness standard under 
Article 14 and the Article 19 level playing field standard. The Court has 
effectively created a hierarchy of norms in economic and privatization 
adjudication by suffusing Article 14 and Article 19 rights-based scrutiny 
with normative content, enabling the Court to advance globalization norms 
of competitiveness, transparency, and accountability.  Corporate interests
Central Government from the early nineties, this view that the Indian society is essentially wedded to 
socialism is definitely withering away.”).
68
See The Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, 
(1995) 2 SCC 161 (the Airwaves Case).
69
Id.
70
Id. See also Madhavi Divan, Telecast Tussle: A Sorry Spectacle, (2004) 4 SCC (Jour) 52, 52–54.
71
See The Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, 
(1995) 2 SCC 161.
72
Cf. Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988).
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thus effectively serve as “rights holders” who in the process of challenging 
government policies have also become vehicles for vindicating these 
globalization norms.
C. The Court’s Role in Shaping and Monitoring the Regulatory
Landscape
In addition to redefining the scope of rights-based scrutiny, the Court 
has played a crucial role in reshaping the regulatory and institutional 
landscape of globalization. Two key examples of the Court’s roles are: 1) 
catalyzing the creation of independent and autonomous regulatory structures,
and 2) expanding anti-corruption and accountability oversight of 
privatization policies.
1. Catalyzing Creation of Independent and Autonomous Regulatory 
Structures and Monitoring and Oversight of Tribunals
The Supreme Court of India has played a crucial role in helping to 
catalyze the development of independent regulatory structures.  For 
example, in the area of telecom regulation, the Court has played a key role in 
catalyzing the formation of independent regulatory authorities like the 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI)
73
and the Telecom Disputes 
Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT).
74
In Cellular Operators 
Association of India v. India (2002), the Court adjudicated an appeal from 
the TDSAT in which the tribunal dismissed a challenge to the government’s 
approval of the use of “wireless services within the local loop” (WLL) 
technology by fixed line operators.  The TDSAT dismissed the case on the 
grounds that TDSAT did not have the authority to challenge the 
government’s decision to approve WLL, as it was a policy decision.
75
On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for “reconsideration with 
special emphasis on the question of level playing field.”
76
The Court’s 
decision ultimately drove the TDSAT to be far more assertive in its scrutiny 
of government actions following the decision.
77
73
Thiruvengadem & Joshi, supra note 39, at 337–38.
74
Id. at 338 (citing COAI v. Union of India, (2002) 2 Comp. LJ 161; COAI v. Union of India, 
(2003) 3 SC 186).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Thiruvengadam and Joshi, supra note 39, at 339 (citing R.U.S. PRASAD, RESOLVING DISPUTES IN 
COMMUNICATIONS: GLOBAL PRACTICES AND CHALLENGES (2011)).
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The Court has also played a significant role in applying and advancing 
globalization norms of liberalization policies against the orders of tribunals 
favoring domestic industries.
78
This is illustrated by the Court’s activity in 
the area of trade and competition law in cases arising under the Monopolistic 
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), including adjudication by the 
Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC).
79
In
Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Manufacturers Association (2002), 
the Court reversed the decision of the MRTPC in orders in the “Soda Ash” 
case and the “Float Glass” case by holding that the MRTPC lacked 
jurisdiction to decide the matters, and held that the MRTPC could not act to 
restrict imports in these cases.
80
While the MRTPC’s decisions were based 
on a protectionist conception of the public interest that was aligned with the 
interests of investors and labor, the Supreme Court’s decision privileged a 
conception of the public interest that favors corporate and industrial entities 
and consumers over the rights and interests of labor.
81
2. Expanding Anti-Corruption and Accountability Oversight in 
Privatization 
While the Court’s exercise of Article 14 non-arbitrariness review has 
been heavily restricted and limited, the Court has also greatly expanded its 
role as an anti-corruption institution, policing corruption in the processes of 
privatization and liberalization.  In doing so, the Court has built on its earlier 
jurisprudence and record in previous corruption cases including the 
landmark Vineet Narain litigation.  In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, the 
Court built on its earlier activism in PIL, broadening its powers to oversee 
and monitor government investigations into corruption by employing its 
power of “continuing mandamus,” based on the mandamus authority under 
Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.
82
The Court held that under Article 
14’s equality provision, the Court was empowered to fill the void left by 
78
See Sen & Suraj, supra note 8.
79
Id. at 16 (citing Aditya Bhattacharjea, Indian Competition Policy: An Assessment, 38(34) ECON. &
POL. WEEKLY 3561–74 (2003).
80
Id. (citing Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Mfrs. Assn (2002)).
81
Id.
82
Article 32 of Indian Constitution provides, in relevant part: “Remedies for enforcement of rights 
conferred by this Part. — (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.  (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to 
issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights 
conferred by this Part.  INDIA CONST. art 32.
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other institutions in preserving and maintaining the rule of law, and that it 
could issue directives and orders to do so under Article 32 and Article 142.
83
The Court has thus expanded the scope of its review to directly 
impugn and challenge government auctions of public resources including the 
2G Telecom Scam Case (2012) and the CoalGate case (2012).
84
In these 
cases, the Court has scrutinized the auction processes for allocation of both 
the telecom spectrum and coal blocks to private entities based on Article 14 
arbitrariness review, while at the same time also playing an active role in 
investigating allegations of corruption.
85
These cases illustrate that despite 
the narrow and limited scope of judicial review articulated by the Court for 
economic policies, the Court continues to play an active role in policing 
corruption in privatization and liberalization policies.
IV. GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE COURT’S ROLE IN 
RESHAPING RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURES, AND NARRATIVES
As India shifted toward economic liberalization in the early 1990s, the
Central and State Governments also expanded investment in large-scale 
development projects aimed at expanding energy resources and building a 
resources infrastructure to support high-growth economic development.
Major examples of this included the construction of hydroelectric plants, 
including the Narmada and Tehri Dams, as well the exploration and 
development of India’s forests and undeveloped lands for mining and 
logging.
86
This Part explores how the Supreme Court has adjudicated the 
scope and meaning of the fundamental rights as it relates to development.
As noted in Part II, following the post-Emergency era, the Court 
dramatically expanded the scope of rights and the permissible scope of court 
intervention in public interest litigation cases involving state governance 
failures, human rights violations, and other forms of state and private 
illegality, including bail undertrials, prison violence, and bonded labor cases. 
Building on the right to life in Article 21 and read together with directive 
principles setting forth state obligations to protect the environment, the 
Court also recognized rights to clean air and water and developed a robust 
body of environmental jurisprudence and principles aimed at taking on 
83
See Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226.
84
See Subramanian Swamy v. A. Raja, (2012) 3 SCC 1 (quashing allocation of telecom licenses); 
Subramaniam Swamy v. A. Raja (2012) 9 SCC 257 (Court adjudication of investigation into 2G scam); 
Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 516 (cancelling Coal Block mining licenses).
85
See Subramaniam Swamy v. A. Raja (2012) 3 S.C.C. 1 (2012); Subramaniam Swamy v. A. Raja 
(2012) 9 SCC 257; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 516.
86
See infra Part IV. 
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widespread environmental degradation.
87
Through environmental public 
interest litigation, the Court sought to take on underenforcement of, and 
noncompliance with, a set of new environmental laws aimed at protecting 
the environment, including India’s water, air, and natural resources,
including rivers and forests.
88
A. Redefining Rights and the Scope of Judicial Review in Development
With respect to India’s natural resources, forest development, and 
accommodation of tribal rights, India’s national development policies have 
posed a direct challenge to the framework of fundamental rights and 
environmental jurisprudence established by the Supreme Court. As in the 
liberalization context, the Court has carved out a highly deferential and 
limited standard of review for large-scale development projects. However, 
in contrast to the Court’s deployment of rights as structuring principles in 
the review of economic policy, the Court in the development context has 
deployed rights as “substantive-normative principles” to guide the Court’s
assessment of development policies and programs. In reality, these
substantive-normative principles inform a highly deferential standard of 
review that assesses (and largely validates) projects in line with
programmatic goals of national development. At the same time, the Court 
has also created an “asymmetrical rights terrain” in the area of development 
by selectively privileging certain rights and interests.
This “asymmetrical rights terrain” in development can be traced to the 
Court’s embrace of an international law conception of the right to 
development, which the Court has deployed so as to effectively subsume
other individual rights.  As Balakrishnan Rajagopal observes, informed by 
the growing influence and spread of Washington consensus-style 
neoliberalism, developed and developing nations have framed their 
understanding of the right to development not as a justiciable, negative right, 
but rather in terms of the broader programmatic goals of economic 
development and growth.
89
However, this national goal-oriented conception 
of the right elides the actual contestation over the meaning of the right to 
87
See generally SHYAM DIVAN AND ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN 
INDIA 41–42 (2001); SATHE, supra note 14, at 224–27.
88
See DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ;, supra note 87, at 41–42; SATHE, supra note 14, at 224–27.
89
RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3, at 220–23 (citing G.A. Res. 
41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986)).  
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development in international law discourse.
90
The UN’s 1968 Declaration 
on the Right to Development (Declaration) defined the right to development 
as an “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person 
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural[,] and political development, in which all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”
91
Consequently, as 
Rajagopal argues, the Declaration suggests that individuals, communities,
and social movements also have the right to development as distinct from 
state and national development interests.
92
However, the Court’s decisions in the Narmada and Tehri 
Dam cases reflect that the Supreme Court has accepted the national goal-
oriented conception of the right to development.
93
The Court has deployed 
this conception of the right to development, as well as principles of 
sustainable development based on the right to life under Article 21 as 
substantive-normative principles to guide the Court’s assessment of the 
constitutionality and legality of government projects. Moreover, in 
embracing this conception of the right to development, while Justice 
Kirpal’s opinion in the Narmada case acknowledged that there are 
“conflicting rights” at play in development projects, the decision subsumes 
fundamental rights into the broader programmatic goals of the nation.
94
   In 
doing so, Justice Kirpal’s “conflicting rights” theory weakens and limits the 
scope and meaning of fundamental rights protections, preventing them from 
serving as a meaningful check on government policy and actions.
In contrast to its decisions involving economic liberalization and 
privatization, which were based largely on rights-based principles and 
scrutiny grounded in Article 14 and 19, the Court’s decisions in
90
Id. at 221–23.  See Tomer Broude, Development Disputes in International Trade, in LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 32 (Yong-Shik Lee et al., eds., 2011) 
(discussing different conceptions of development in international law).
91
Furthermore, Rajagopal argues that the Declaration “implies the full realization of the right of 
peoples to self-determination and ‘their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources.’”  RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3, at 221.
92
Id.
93
See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Limits of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization: The Indian 
Supreme Court and the Narmada Valley Struggle, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 187, 204–05 
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, eds., 2005) [hereinafter Rajagopal, The 
Limits of Law]; RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3.
94
See Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 644, 764.  See also Rajagopal,
The Limits of Law, supra note 93 at 207 (arguing that the Court’s decision reflects a “legalist/dominant” 
script wherein the Court accepted that because existing constitutional and statutory law provided 
authorization for the Dam project, the court was prevented the Court from challenging the Dam project on 
the basis of fundamental rights violations).
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development cases focused on the rights contained in Article 21, rights 
related to sustainable development and ecology, and tribal rights. Similar to 
the liberalization and privatization context, the Court has embraced an 
understanding of rights that is based on a fundamental asymmetry between 
development interests and the rights of farmers and villagers who are 
displaced by development. The Court has largely privileged the interests of 
the government and the private sector in the name of advancing a vision of 
national development, while largely diminishing the individual rights of 
farmers, villagers, and tribes.  
In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India (2000), the Supreme 
Court of India adjudicated the legality of the actions of the Central and State 
governments relating both to environmental clearances and mitigation and 
resettlement of displaced persons resulting from the construction of the 
Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River.
95
Although the Court had 
originally stayed construction on the project in earlier orders, the Court’s 
2000 decision represented a strong endorsement and validation of the project 
from a constitutional and legal perspective. The petitioners in Narmada
challenged the terms of the Award issued by the Narmada Water Disputes 
Tribunal’s decision of August 16, 1978, which stipulated what the height of 
the dam should be, provided “directions regarding submergence, land 
acquisition[,] and rehabilitation of the displaced persons,” and “defined the 
meaning of the land, oustee[,] and family,” and allocation of the water 
between the four main states (Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, and 
Maharasthra).
96
In upholding the project and providing further guidelines for 
mitigation and resettling of those displaced by the construction of the dam 
project, the Court praised the benefits and virtues of the dam project in terms 
of energy production, provision of water, and national development.
97
The 
Court relied on the following main rationales in its decision.  First, the Court 
held that the petitioners’ claims were barred by laches as they had failed to 
bring the challenge much earlier following the government’s clearance of 
the project in 1987.
98
Second, in recognizing constitutional and statutory 
95
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96
Id. at  686.
97
Id. at 701–04.  Rajagopal, The Limits of Law, supra note 93, at 202, 204–05.
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Id. at 695.  See SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND 
POSITIVE DUTIES (2008); Rajagopal, The Limits of Law, supra note 93, at 207–08 (criticizing the court’s 
invocation and application of the doctrine of laches as inconsistent with its earlier rights jurisprudence, and 
“factually inaccurate and in bad faith” in light of the litigants’ previous attempts to litigate in lower courts 
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authorization for the project, the Court applied a highly deferential standard 
of review in determining whether the Government had conducted its 
environmental clearance review processes in line with statutory 
requirements.
99
In contrast, Justice Bharucha’s dissenting opinion held that 
Article 21 required that the government complete a more robust 
environmental clearance and review process prior to continuing construction 
on the dam.
100
Third, the Court upheld the Government’s resettlement and 
rehabilitation policies for those displaced by submergence.
The high level of deference in the Court’s ruling is noteworthy, 
especially given that this rationale was cited in BALCO and other cases.
Justice Kirpal’s majority judgment articulated a circumscribed role for 
courts in reviewing development, noting:
In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by 
the Government the Courts should not become an approval 
authority . . . . If a considered policy decision has been taken, 
which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will 
not be in Public Interest to require the Court to go into and 
investigate those areas which are the function of the 
executive . . . .
101
In addition, the Court’s decision effectively embraced a restricted 
conception of the right to life under Article 21, despite the Court’s earlier 
jurisprudence suggesting that Article 21’s protections were quite robust.
102
Remarkably, the Court not only endorsed the underlying merits of the dam 
project and its benefits, but also held that the fundamental rights of those 
displaced by the dam project were not violated because the Relief and 
Rehabilitation programs would actually improve the quality of the lives of 
those displaced.  In reaching its holding, the Court actively embraced a
vision of development and modernization which suggests that displacement,
resettlement, and compensation are far preferable to the status quo of village 
existence, thereby diminishing the cultural identity and rights of villagers 
and the rural poor.
103
In doing so, the Court held that the relief and 
99
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100
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101
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102
See supra note 21 and accompanying text for discussion of cases expanding the scope of rights 
based on the right to life and liberty under Article 21.
103
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 644, at 765. (Kirpal, J.).
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rehabilitation programs would in the aggregate improve the quality of life of 
those displaced by these projects.
104
The Court relied on its earlier decision in the Narmada case in 
upholding the government’s policies with respect to the Tehri Dam in N.D. 
Jayal v. Union of India (2007) (Tehri Dam case or Jayal).
105
In that case, 
the Court again adopted a highly deferential standard of review to examine
the government’s compliance with the Environment (Protection) Act’s
requirements, and MoEF’s own clearance requirements.  Although a report 
from the Hanumatha Rao committee found several violations of the 
conditions on which the MoEF had given environmental clearance, and 
suggested the need for further studies on the environmental impact of the
project, the Court still upheld the government’s actions under a highly 
deferential standard of scrutiny.
106
In addition, the Court in Jayal followed the Narmada case in holding 
that the precautionary principle’s requirement of placing the burden of proof 
on developing interests was inapplicable to hydroelectric dam projects.
107
The Court in Jayal held that while the right to a clean environment under 
Article 21 may serve as a limitation on development projects, based on its 
decision Samatha, development itself may be a conceptualized as a right 
under Article 21.
108
In discussing the “right to development,” the Court
redefined the scope of Article 21 to bolster and justify government 
development policies: “The right to development encompasses much more 
than economic well being, and includes within its definition the guarantee of 
fundamental human rights. The ‘development’ is not related only to the 
growth of GNP.”
109
The Court also cited to Amartya Sen’s Development As 
Freedom in which Sen posited that “the issue of development cannot be 
separated from the conceptual framework of human right.”
110
104
Id. (Kirpal, J.) (“It is not fair that tribals and the people in undeveloped villages should continue in 
the same condition without ever enjoying the fruits of science and technology for better health and have a 
higher quality of life style. Should they not be encouraged to seek greener pastures elsewhere, if they can 
have access to it, either through their own efforts due to information exchange or due too outside 
compulsions... In the present case, the R&R packages of the States are such that the living conditions of the 
oustees will be much better than what they had in their tribal hamlets.”).
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Id. at 382.
110
Id.
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Despite invoking Sen’s human rights-based approach to development, 
the Court ultimately upheld the project under a collectivist goal-oriented
conception of development, notwithstanding its impact on the rights of the 
rural poor and tribal communities who would be displaced: 
The right to development includes the whole spectrum of civil, 
cultural, economic, political[,] and social process, for the 
improvement of peoples’ well being and realization of their full 
potential . . . . Of course, construction of a dam or a mega 
project is definitely an attempt to achieve the goal of 
wholesome development.
111
Finally, the Court in Jayal also upheld the government’s rehabilitation 
and relief programs for those displaced by the dam’s construction.
However, in actually reviewing the remediation and relief package, the 
Court again was highly deferential in its review, and accepted the 
recommendations of the Rao committee without question or challenge.
112
B. Contesting Development Rights and Narratives at the Frontier
Despite the strong endorsement of the merits of development in the 
Narmada and Tehri Dam cases, the Court has not always spoken with a 
unified voice.  This is illustrated by the Court’s decision in Samatha v. State 
of A.P. (1997).
113
In that decision, the Court held that under the Fifth 
Schedule of the Indian Constitution and the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled 
Areas and Land Transfer Regulation Act of 1959, no land or mining leases 
in tribal areas could be transferred to non-tribals. The Court’s decision was 
a win for tribal self-governance, as the decision held that only the “State 
Mineral Development Corporation or a cooperative of the tribal people 
could take up mining activity and that too in compliance with the Forest 
Conservation Act and the Environment Protection Act.”
114
The Court’s 
decision was a strong win for tribal rights, but was also noteworthy for its 
discussion of development. 
In sharp contrast to the discussion of the right to development in the 
Jayal case, the Court in Samatha suggested that the right to development 
also must be interpreted in light of the socialist character of India’s 
111
Id.
112
Id. at 386–87.
113
See Samatha, v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 8 SCC 191.
114
Id. at 244.  See also Asha Krishnakumar, The ‘Samata Judgment’, FRONTLINE (Sept. 2004), 
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constitution.
115
The Court thus held that development required attention to 
the promotion and protection of social and economic rights of the poor, of 
the dalits (or “scheduled castes”), and of tribes in light of the protections
contained in the directive principles in Articles 38, 39, and 46, which should 
inform interpretation of Article 21.
116
Additionally, the Court held that the 
object of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution was “not only to 
prevent acquisition, holding, or disposal of the land in Scheduled Areas by 
the non-tribals from the tribals or alienation of such land among non-tribals 
inter se but also to ensure that the tribals remain in possession and 
enjoyment of the lands in Scheduled areas for their economic empowerment, 
social status and dignity of their person.”
117
In other recent decisions, the Court challenged in part the dominant 
pro-development narratives that have informed its decisions in the Narmada
and Tehri Dam cases.  For example, in Nandini Sundar v. State of 
Chattisgarh (2011), the Court held that the state government’s establishment 
of the Salwa Judum, an army that included child soldiers recruited to fight 
Naxalite rebels, violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.  In reaching 
this decision, the Court cited some of the negative consequences of 
globalization and development in India and suggested that globalization 
policies had directly led to the rise of violent agitation movements like the 
Naxalite movement.
118
Still, while the Court in Sundar embraced a critical 
posture toward globalization in India, the discourse of this judgment has not 
translated into a broad judicial attack on globalization policies generally.
C. Development Governance Structures and Governance Narratives: The 
Forest Case, Development and Fundamental Rights
In the domain of privatization and liberalization, the Supreme Court 
of India has been assertive in recommending or mandating the creation of 
independent regulatory bodies to police and regulate liberalization and
privatization policies, including the TRAI.  In addition, as illustrated by the 
Court’s decisions in the 2G Telecom case and CoalGate case, the Court has 
also been assertive in scrutinizing and challenging the processes by which 
natural resources are allocated to private interests.  In contrast, as illustrated 
by the Narmada Dam and Tehri Dam cases, the Court has been far more 
deferential to the expertise and judgment of the government’s own executive 
115
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agencies, expert committees, and regulatory bodies in their assessments 
regarding environmental impact reports and provisions for relief and 
rehabilitation of displaced persons.  
Despite the Court’s strong pro-tribal and human rights judgment in 
Samatha, the Supreme Court has had a mixed record when it comes to the 
rights of tribes in cases involving encroachment in India’s forests. In 
contrast to the Narmada and Tehri Dam contexts, the Court has been more 
far more assertive in recommending, and indeed creating, new governance 
structures and bodies in other development contexts in the Godavarman 
Forest case litigation.
119
In that context, the Court has established high-
powered committees, appointed amicus curiae who have functioned much 
like government ministers, and closely monitored state and national 
government compliance with the Forest Act and the Court’s own judgments 
and orders.  Although the Court has received significant praise for its 
activism and assertiveness in seeking to protect and conserve India’s forests 
in line with the Forest Act and constitutional mandates for environmental
protection, some of the Court’s orders undermined the fundamental rights of 
tribes and villagers in India.  The Court’s actions in Godavarman v. Union of 
India illustrate how by creating parallel court-led bureaucracy aimed at 
conservation, the Court itself became an agent of development and 
displacement.
In 1996, following the filing of a writ petition aimed at curbing 
deforestation of the Nilgiris forest caused by illegal logging, the Court in 
Godavarman adopted an expansive definition of the term “forest” in 
interpreting the Forest Conservation Act of 1980, and through a series of 
orders aimed at curbing logging, mining, and other activities, effectively 
took over the management and governance of India’s forests.
120
Significantly, in advancing a particular conception of sustainable 
development, this article suggests that the Court-established forest 
governance bureaucracy itself became a vehicle for creating a distinct 
“asymmetrical rights terrain” in development.
This is illustrated in the series of guidelines issued by the Court and 
its committees as part of the complex afforestation management regime 
119
See T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, (1996) 9 SCR 982; Godavarman v. Union 
of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267.
120
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created in the Godavarman case.  As part of this regime, and in response to 
the MoEF’s own failures to implement Court orders, the Court, with the 
support of its own Central Empowered Committee (CEC), issued a series of 
guidelines requiring that state governments pay the “net present value” 
(NPV) of forest land that was allocated for mining and private development 
projects.
121
Funds from the NPV were then supposed to be allocated in 
support of afforestation programs.
122
When some state governments were 
found to have diverted NPV funds to non-afforestation purposes, the Court 
ordered the MoEF to create the Compensatory Afforestation Management 
and Planning Agency (CAMPA) in order to manage the funds collected.
123
As a result the new CAMPA agency was empowered to bypass state 
governments and to use the funds collected to directly fund afforestation 
activities by conservation organizations.
124
This court-managed system of 
forest governance effectively privileged development interests by 
accommodating their activities through a particular model of sustainable 
forest development.  
While elevating the rights and interests of state governments and 
development industries as part of a broader sustainable development model 
based on afforestation and compensation, the Court also played a major role 
in abrogating the rights of the rural poor and tribal populations in the forests.
In a series of orders in 2001 and 2002, in response to recommendations from 
amicus curiae Harish Salve, the Court ordered a series of eviction drives that 
resulted in mass displacement of the rural poor and tribal populations that 
inhabited and utilized forest land.
125
This portrait of the Court’s forest 
governance management regime illustrates how even court-led bureaucracies 
can replicate the rights-oppression and displacement of the state.
V. CONCLUSION
Globalization policies have fundamentally altered the relationship of 
the state vis-à-vis the citizens in India.  Despite the Supreme Court’s
creation of a robust and expansive rights infrastructure in the immediate
post-Emergency era, the Court has constrained and limited the scope of 
fundamental rights, and rights-based judicial scrutiny of globalization 
121
Id. at 10035.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. See also Anuradha Kumar, A Controversial Eviction Drive, FRONTLINE (2002), 
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1915/19150460.htm
 
                                                        
JUNE 2016 Globalization, Rights, and Judicial Review in India 671
policies in the post-1991 era. This article has suggested that the Court’s 
approach to judicial review reflects a unique model of adjudication in which 
high courts play an active role in shaping the meaning of rights, regulatory 
structure and norms, and the legal-constitutional discourse of globalization.
In reshaping the terrain of rights in the post-liberalization era, the 
Court’s role and jurisprudence in adjudicating globalization cases will 
continue to have profound consequences for the future of human rights and 
environmental protection in India.  Major shifts in the Court’s jurisprudential 
approach and institutional role present both structural and normative 
challenges for the cause of human rights, social justice, and environmental 
protection in India.  Structurally, the Court’s creation of asymmetrical rights 
terrains threatens to weaken the potential role that courts can play in 
vindicating and safeguarding the rights of workers, villagers, the urban and 
rural poor, and tribal populations most affected by transformational changes 
in India’s economy and development of its natural resources. Indeed, both 
government and court-led governance structures have largely excluded 
channels for those who have been displaced by globalization to block and 
resist large-scale development projects.
From a normative standpoint, the Court’s redefinition and reshaping
of the discourse of liberalization, and its reframing of development
narratives, has arguably altered both the regulatory environment, and limited 
the scope of meaningful rights advocacy and litigation in the courts.  In 
embracing a conception of the right to development that is based on national 
and centralized planning goals, the Supreme Court’s development 
jurisprudence limits the possibility of recognizing meaningful countervailing 
rights that can be deployed in opposition to state-led development policies 
and projects.  This article thus highlights the need for scholars, advocates, 
and policy-makers to carefully reassess the Court’s rights jurisprudence, and 
the underlying development rights narratives that inform judicial worldviews
and opinions in globalization.  The Court’s reframing of rights narratives in 
globalization cases threatens to weaken its potential as an oppositional actor 
in resisting state development imperatives, and with it, the possibility of a 
more humane jurisprudence of globalization rights.
 
